13/04/2026
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) has become one of the defining challenges for democratic societies in the 21st century. FIMI encompasses intentional, manipulative, and often coordinated actions, by state or non‑state actors, that distort the information environment, undermine democratic processes, and polarise societies. Recent EU documents emphasise that FIMI is not merely about disinformation, but includes a spectrum of behaviours such as censorship, hybrid threats, and covert influence operations1. While much public attention has focused on disinformation, a less examined phenomenon is emerging across Europe: information suppression. The RESONANT project undertakes one of the most comprehensive efforts to date to understand this concept, document its real‑world manifestations, and assess the risks it poses to European states, diaspora communities, and individuals.
At its core, information suppression refers to the intentional efforts of state and non‑state actors to control or eliminate information that is relevant, timely, and necessary for public life. This may occur before information is publicly disseminated, (proactive phase) or after it begins to circulate (reactive phase). By blocking, manipulating, or removing information, these actors aim to influence public opinion, restrict access to information and knowledge, or maintain secrecy, frequently as part of wider FIMI operations. What makes this more complex than traditional censorship is its transnational, multi‑layered nature as regimes extend their reach beyond national borders, targeting communities thousands of kilometres away.
To explore this hidden landscape, RESONANT researchers combined an extensive literature review and fifty-six in‑depth interviews with members of six diaspora communities: Chinese, Iranian, Turkish, Russian, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan, living within the European Union. The team documented ninety‑one incidents of information suppression, some drawn from existing research and many emerging directly from personal experiences throughout the interviews. Together, these elements form the RESONANT Information Suppression Dataset, a tool that reveals both the scale of the phenomenon and its effects.
One of the most striking features of the study is the consistency with which authoritarian regimes deploy similar tactics abroad. Chinese interviewees, for instance, recounted how embassy‑affiliated groups mobilise counter‑protests to drown out diaspora activists, how content is quietly removed from platforms such as WeChat, and how individuals fear that their family members in China may face consequences for diaspora members’ public statements in Europe. Iranians described receiving anonymous messages and threats from individuals linked to security agencies, attempts to disrupt academic or cultural events, and a steady pressure that induces self‑censorship even in private conversations. Russian participants spoke of troll attacks, online harassment, and an ever‑present fear that political activity abroad could trigger retaliation against relatives back home. Venezuelan and Nicaraguan interviewees reported that their governments systematically suppress domestic information, creating informational asymmetries that complicate communication with their families and shape the nature of political engagement abroad. Turkish participants pointed to the effects of
transnational repression, particularly on Kurdish communities, and the growing normalisation of fear, silence, and mistrust.
What these diverse cases demonstrate is that information suppression is not merely a political strategy; its consequences are deeply human. At the macro level, RESONANT documents information suppression threats to democratic systems, including the erosion of trust in institutions, the weakening of citizen participation, and the increased vulnerability of societies to polarisation. When access to reliable information is restricted or manipulated, citizens become more dependent on unverified sources, creating fertile ground for conspiracy theories and radicalisation. In this environment, authoritarian states find opportunities to expand their influence by exploiting social divisions, promoting confusion, and undermining trust in democratic processes.
At the meso or group level, that of diaspora communities, the consequences are equally profound. RESONANT documets that diaspora groups often live in a state of ambiguity: integrated into European societies yet still connected, emotionally and socially, to their countries of origin. The pressures of surveillance, online harassment, and coercion‑by‑proxy create fractures within these communities. Individuals adopt pseudonyms, avoid public gatherings, and communicate through encrypted platforms. Trust becomes fragile. Even within cultural or academic settings, people may refrain from expressing opinions if fellow nationals are present, fearing reports to embassies or informal networks loyal to the non-democratic home regimes.
This environment of suspicion can slowly dissolve the social fabric of diaspora groups, producing isolation, fragmentation, and internal conflict. Some interviewees rejected the very idea of being called a “diaspora,” either because the term felt politically charged or because it implied a level of exile they preferred not to acknowledge. Others noted that generational divides deepen under these conditions, as younger migrants push for activism while older relatives urge caution to protect those still living in authoritarian contexts.
At the individual level, the effects are psychologically and economically debilitating. Individuals described anxiety, hypervigilance, guilt, and identity conflicts. Many spoke of the constant tension between wanting to speak the truth and needing to protect loved ones. Journalists and activists reported that the mental toll of harassment and threats forced them to scale back their work, abandon projects, or withdraw from public life. Academics shifted research agendas to avoid sensitive topics. Ordinary citizens limited their social interactions, avoided political discussions, and retreated into silence.
These dynamics extend into the economic realm. Exiled journalists often work precarious jobs to finance their professional activities and live abroad. Activists rely on fragile networks of support. Some participants noted that even their employment prospects are shaped by self‑censorship, as public visibility may trigger digital or offline harassment.
Understanding information suppression, therefore, requires examining not only how information is controlled but also how fear becomes embedded in everyday life. Diaspora communities live with a dual vulnerability: they are subjects of authoritarian interest abroad and residents of democracies that are still developing strategies to protect them. The ambiguity of this status increases insecurity and raises important questions for European institutions.
Research carried out as part of the RESONANT project emphasises that protecting diaspora communities is not only a matter of safeguarding a minority or a group of migrants or exiles, but also
a matter of democratic resilience. When authoritarian regimes are successful in exporting repression to Europe, they undermine fundamental rights, reshape political behaviour and degrade the quality of public debate. These effects spread, affecting not only the individuals concerned, but also society at large that shares the civic space.
By documenting incidents, identifying risks, and analysing the lived experiences of diasporas, the RESONANT dataset offers a foundation for new policy tools and protective mechanisms.
The development of a set of methodological tools would help governments, civil society, and European institutions to detect and counteract the suppression of information. It also emphasises the need for legal frameworks and public policies that support those facing such transnational pressures, ensuring the full protection of their information and expression of rights within the EU.
The work carried out in RESONANT makes one point unmistakably clear: information suppression is not an abstract threat occurring only in cyberspace. It is happening within Europe, shaping the everyday lives of residents, challenging the integrity of democratic systems, and calling for urgent, coordinated action.
1 European Union External Action Service. 4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats: Dismantling the FIMI House of Cards (Brussels, 2026).
Written by: URJC